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Abstract
Youth is one of the phases in the life-cycle when some of the most decisive
life transitions take place. Entering the labour market or leaving parental
home are events with important consequences for the economic well-being
of young adults. In this paper, the interrelationship between employment,
residential emancipation and poverty dynamics is studied for eight European
countries by means of an econometric model with feedback eﬀects. Results
show that youth poverty genuine state dependence is positive and highly sig-
niﬁcant. Evidence proves there is a strong causal eﬀect between poverty and
leaving home in Scandinavian countries, however, time in economic hardship
does not last long. In Southern Europe, instead, youth tend to leave their
parental home much later in order to avoid falling into a poverty state that is
more persistent. Past poverty has negative consequences on the likelihood of
employment.
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11 Introduction
The analysis of youth poverty dynamics has received little attention in the literature
despite the considerable amount of interest devoted to the study of poverty tran-
sience and the development of youth poverty studies. In fact, in the last two decades,
the literature on poverty dynamics has mainly focused on the adult population while
youth poverty analyses have mainly been done from a static perspective.1
In this paper, we argue that a better understanding of youth poverty dynamics
is necessary if we are to design eﬀective policies at ﬁghting it. Youth is a temporary
phase in the life cycle when some of the most important life opportunities are decided
yet we know very little about the nature of poverty while young.2
On the one hand, this paper is devoted to the analysis of youth genuine state
dependence in the poverty status, that is, we analyse to what extent experiencing
poverty in a given period has a causal eﬀect on future poverty. We decompose youth
poverty persistence caused by observed and unobserved heterogeneity from the one
due to genuine state dependence. Distinguishing between the two has important
consequences for the design of social policies aimed at ﬁghting economic hardship. If
youth poverty is driven by genuine state dependence, helping young people to move
above the poverty line today will reduce their likelihood of experiencing poverty
tomorrow. Instead, if youth poverty is mainly due to heterogeneity, policies will
have to be addressed at enhancing those characteristics that are protective factors
against economic disadvantage.
On the other hand, in this study, we argue that youth poverty cannot be mea-
sured independently from certain life transitions as they have lasting consequences
on young people’s economic well-being. More precisely, we analyse how poverty re-
lates with employment and leaving parental home by modelling simultaneously the
three outcomes and allowing for feedback eﬀects. We claim that only by acknowl-
1See Jenkins (2000) for a review of the literature on modelling poverty transitions and Aassve,
Iacovou, and Mencarini (2006) and Iacovou and Aassve (2007) for comprehensive surveys of youth
poverty studies from a static point of view.
2As a matter of fact, the literature has been more concerned about the consequences of ex-
periencing poverty during childhood than while young. Yet, it has not been proven that youth
poverty has less long-lasting consequences for individuals than child poverty (see Hobcraft, 2003,
for a similar argument).
2edging spill-over eﬀects between the three processes, we can properly deal with the
endogeneity problems that arise when studying life transitions possibly taking place
in a sequential manner. As far as we know, similar estimates do not exist in the
literature.
Thus, a particular contribution of the paper is the estimation of a dynamic
trivariate probit model for poverty, employment and leaving parental home with
feedback eﬀects between the three processes (see Biewen, 2004, 2008) that allows
the measurement of state dependence, accounts for the initial conditions problem
(see Wooldridge, 2005), controls for unobserved heterogeneity and non-random se-
lection of the sample. Improving the existing proposal in the literature, we unrestrict
the cross-process unobserved correlation structure by allowing random eﬀects to be
diﬀerent in each equation and freely correlated.
The questions this study aims at answering can be summarised as follows. Is
poverty temporarily lived by youth across Europe or rather is of permanent nature?
Is poverty persistence explained by genuine state dependence and/or by observed
and unobserved individual characteristics? Can youth poverty dynamics be mea-
sured independently from leaving home decisions or labour market opportunities?
What is the link between employment and residential emancipation and how do
both phenomena relate with poverty? Importantly, we expect the results to diﬀer
according to the institutional settings, the generosity of the Welfare State provision,
the dynamism of youth labour markets and the cultural values, among other factors.
Data is from the European Community Household Panel and transitions refer
to the period between 1994 and 2000. Our analysis is based on Spain, Italy, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Ireland. Thus, this is also a
comparative analysis.
Main results show that there is a considerable degree of youth poverty genuine
state dependence. Poverty today increases in itself the likelihood of being poor
tomorrow among young individuals. Yet, this scarring eﬀect is shortly lived in
Scandinavia as compared to Southern or Continental Europe. Furthermore, past
poverty decreases the likelihood of employment nearly everywhere while it only
lessens the chances of residential emancipation in Italy and France.
3This paper is structured as follows. Next section revises the literature on youth
poverty dynamics. Section 3 presents the data set used and our deﬁnitions of youth,
poverty, employment and emancipation. Section 4 illustrates the relationships be-
tween poverty, employment and leaving home which allows foreseeing some of the
eﬀects that will be conﬁrmed by the econometric model. Section 5 presents the
econometric technique and Section 6 the empirical results. Section 7 summarises
our main ﬁndings and discusses avenues for future research.
2 Youth poverty dynamics in the literature
Literature on youth poverty has mainly focused on the study of the economic sit-
uation of young individuals from a static perspective. Thanks to the availability
of comparative data, we have a fairly good description of youth poverty patterns
across the European Union (Middleton, 2002; Aassve, Iacovou, and Mencarini, 2006;
Iacovou and Aassve, 2007). We have learnt about the importance of living with the
family of origin, being in a stable job or having an employed partner as protecting
factors against youth poverty (Iacovou and Berthoud, 2003). We also know better
about the relationship between youth poverty and the life-cycle (Kangas and Palme,
2000; Rigg and Sefton, 2004) or between poverty and leaving parental home (Aassve,
Iacovou, and Mencarini, 2006). Yet, our knowledge of youth poverty dynamics is
still scarce. The existing literature is revised in what follows.
Aassve et al. (2005) study the impact of certain life events on the probability of
entry into and exit from poverty amongst young people. Their results conﬁrm that
leaving the parental home (especially in Scandinavian Europe) and childbearing
are associated with poverty entry while cohabitation with a partner stands as a
protective factor against it. Furthermore, poverty exits are related with job stability
and not just with employment or end of education.
The relationship between leaving the parental home and poverty entry is further
studied in Aassve et al. (2007) and Parisi (2008). Using propensity score matching
techniques and with a sample of 13 European countries, Aassve et al. (2007) conﬁrm
that residential emancipation strongly increases the risk of poverty entry in those
4countries where leaving home occurs early as in Denmark or Finland. The same is
not true for countries where emancipation is delayed. In a similar fashion, Parisi
(2008) estimates that, in Southern Europe, youth with those characteristics that
make them more prone to leave, younger or from poorer family background are
more likely to enter poverty when they emancipate.
Furthermore, Cant´ o and Mercader (2001a) study the economic consequences
for the family of origin of youth emancipation in Spain. Their results show that
leaving home increases the poverty entry rate of the remaining household members
pointing to the fact that youth economic contribution in the parental home prior to
emancipation is important in countries like Spain. Instead, no signiﬁcant eﬀect is
observed in relation to poverty exits.
As for youth poverty duration, Mendola, Busetta, and Aassve (2008), even if
without strictly modelling dynamics, study poverty persistence in several European
countries by analysing the number of periods that an individual is recorded to be
below the poverty line. Based on a generalised ordinal logit model, they ﬁnd that
despite of the high levels of poverty experienced by young people in Social Demo-
cratic countries, their poverty experience is very temporary in nature thanks to
the generosity of the Welfare State provision and the dynamism of labour markets.
Moreover, Cant´ o and Mercader (2001a) show that the presence of an employed
youth in the parental household signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of persisting in
poverty in Spain by avoiding entrance if the household head is not employed and by
promoting exit if employed.
Thus, the literature has highlighted the importance of leaving parental home and
employment as key features to take into account when analysing poverty among
young adults. Yet, none of the revised contributions considers the endogeneity /
simultaneity problems that arise when modelling poverty in a time of demographic
and labour market transitions. This is a drawback that we take up in this work by
jointly modelling employment, residential emancipation and poverty while allowing
for feedback eﬀects and controlling for initial conditions and unobserved heterogene-
ity. As a result, we are able to present a measure of youth poverty genuine state
dependence for each analysed country and estimates of scarring eﬀects between the
5diﬀerent processes.
3 Data and deﬁnitions
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which is a
harmonised cross-national longitudinal survey collected across all members of the
former European Union-15 between 1994 and 2001 — except for Austria and Fin-
land that joined in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Our analysis is based on the com-
ponents from Spain, Italy, Finland, Denmark, Germany, France, United Kingdom
and Ireland. Possibly the greatest advantage of the ECHP is that a standardised
questionnaire is answered each year by a representative sample of individuals and
households which allows comparative analysis across countries as the one we pro-
pose here. On the negative side, only the population living in private households is
represented in the ECHP thus, our study does not cover youth living in community
housing or without stable accommodation.
Our working sample is restricted to those individuals between 16 and 29 years
of age at the ﬁrst time they participate in the panel. The lower end is because the
ECHP contains detailed information for individuals 16 or older. The upper end may
seem very high but in Southern Europe it is only in youth late twenties when most of
the transitions to adulthood take place.3 Furthermore, the sample is an unbalanced
panel which allows to draw the results from all the information available in the data
set. The number of observations is detailed in the table A.1 of the Appendix.
Importantly note that poverty transitions can only be measured for the period
between 1994 and 2000 (and 1996 to 2000 in the Finnish case). This is so because
all the annual income variables are collected retrospectively in the ECHP. Thus,
interviews that took place during the ﬁrst wave of the panel in 1994 asked about the
incomes obtained in 1993. As we do not want to neglect this time bias (see Debels
and Vandecasteele, 2008), we build net household income at t summing up the
incomes of all individuals present in the household at t−1. This methodology leaves
3The European Commission proposed in the Laeken indicators aimed at the study of poverty
and social exclusion the analysis of the age group between 16 and 24. We ﬁnd this age bound too
restrictive in the case of our analysis.
6us with only seven waves to be used as we cannot build household income referred to
1993 because we do not know household composition for that year. Unfortunately,
this methodological decision makes a certain number of missing values to arise when
one of the household members attrit or does not inform about his/her income. Yet,
we preferred to correct the time bias and deal with attrition within our methodology
(see below).
Finally, and as for the deﬁnitions of the main variables of interest, we considered
poor each young person with household equivalent income below 60% of the median,
being the threshold time and country speciﬁc. Also incomes are made equivalent
by using the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale that gives a weight of 1 to the ﬁrst
member in the household, 0.5 to the rest of adults and 0.3 to children below 14 years
of age. Furthermore, as normally set in poverty studies, we accept all individual
incomes are pooled together and equally shared among members. We deﬁne that
an individual is employed if s/he is normally working 15 or more hours per week
according to a self-deﬁned variable. And, ﬁnally, we consider as emancipated that
young person that lives in a household where none of the registered members are
his/her progenitors.4
4 The relationship between youth poverty, employ-
ment and leaving home
4.1 Poverty and the time of leaving home
The relationship between poverty and the time of leaving home is analysed in Figure
1 which shows, for each country, youth poverty headcount during the four years
before and after residential emancipation. In the ﬁgure, t = 0 (marked with a
vertical line) is the last period we observe young individuals in the parental home.
Note that the sample in this case is limited to those individuals that are yet living
with their parents the ﬁrst time they participate in the panel and we observe them
4Throughout the paper, emancipation always refers to the residential status of the young indi-
vidual and not to economic emancipation or other kind.
7leaving.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
As already well documented in the literature, the most striking diﬀerences in
the youth poverty rates before and after emancipation are found in Nordic countries
while the least in the Mediterranean ones (see Aassve et al., 2005; Aassve, Iacovou,
and Mencarini, 2006 and Aassve et al., 2007).
In Spain and Italy, the poverty risk keeps decreasing during the four years pre-
vious to leaving the parental home but it does so also during two or three years
after emancipation. Young Mediterraneans remain in the parental home until they
can economically guarantee themselves a smooth residential transition. The period
prior to emancipation is taken by Italians and Spaniards as an opportunity to ac-
cumulate resources (savings, home ownership, human capital, etc.) that will assure
a similar level of economic well-being while emancipated than the one enjoyed in
their parental home.5 Note however the increase in the risk of poverty of Italians
few years after emancipation explained by the fact that 58.8% of Italians would be
in charge of at least one child in their fourth year out of the parental home while
only 29.1% of Spaniards.
On the contrary, the poverty risk for Danish and Finnish youth it multiplies by
15 times between the year previous to emancipation and the ﬁrst year outside the
parental home. This is readily explained by the fact that leaving home is closely
associated with pursuing education in both countries. For instance, in Denmark, at
t = 0, young individuals had a poverty risk of 2.3% while once out of the parental
home (t = 1) it increases to 41.7%.6 Nevertheless, there is also, in both countries,
a clear and fast pattern of poverty risk decrease in the successive years after eman-
cipation. Thus, for the majority of youth, time in economic hardship does not last
long.
5See Alessie, Brugiavini, and Weber (2006) on the eﬀects of cohabitation on household savings
decisions in Italy and the Netherlands.
6Notice how this descriptive analysis does not take into account the fact that home stayers and
leavers may have diﬀerent characteristics that make the latter more prone to leave home and enter
poverty. The econometric model we present in the next section does take into account possible
selection eﬀects.
8The patterns of the poverty risk and the time of leaving home in Germany,
France, UK and Ireland are somehow in between those observed for Mediterranean
and Nordic countries. We can see a certain increase in the poverty risk when leaving
parental home but it is smoother (especially in Ireland) than the one experienced
by Danish and Finns.
For the analysis of the inﬂuence of poverty in the family of origin on the decision
to leave parental home, we have computed emancipation rates separately for poor
and non-poor youth. The same pattern emerges in all the analysed countries: youth
emancipation rates are lower if the family of origin is in economic hardship as already
found by Cant´ o and Mercader (2001b) for the Spanish case.
4.2 Employment and leaving home decisions
Figure 2 shows the percentage of employed and residentially emancipated youth by
age group in each of the analysed countries. A vertical line at the age of 25 is drawn
to ease comparison.
Interestingly, for Spain and Italy, but also for Ireland, the percentage of young
people employed is always above the percentage of residentially emancipated, point-
ing out to the fact that for the majority of young individuals employment takes place
earlier than emancipation. Survival analysis estimates for residential emancipation
and entry into the labour market illustrate that young Italians and Spaniards spend
2 to 3 years working before leaving parental home depending on the age group. In
Ireland, it takes up to 4 years for the age group 20 to 24.7 This ﬁnding goes hand
in hand with the commented results about the relationship between poverty and
the decision to leave the parental home: youth delay their emancipation while ac-
cumulating enough human capital or economic resources until they feel prepared to
leave.8
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
7We use Kaplan-Meier estimates for the ﬁrst time young people are employed and among those
initially living with their parents.
8Jurado Guerrero (2001) argues that in Spain not leaving parental home under precarious
economic conditions might even be a social norm.
9A similar pattern is found in the United Kingdom and Germany among youngest
youth. Yet, emancipation and employment in both countries take place in a more
simultaneous fashion for relatively late leavers (25 or older). Time between ﬁrst
job and leaving home is only around one year, shorter than for their Mediterranean
counterparts.
In Northern Europe, instead, leaving home takes place much earlier and before
entering the labour market, being the pattern especially clear in Finland. For the
majority of Finns, and especially for those above 20, employment is not a necessary
condition for emancipation. In Denmark, we observe the same pattern only for those
22 or older. The youngest group (16 to 21) leaves home approximately one year after
having acquired the ﬁrst job. Youngest youth with less employability search their
ﬁrst job while enjoying the economic security of being in the parental home.
Finally, in France, the percentage of youth that is employed is very similar to
those residentially emancipated and survival analysis estimates prove both tran-
sitions take place simultaneously for many individuals. Jurado Guerrero (2001)
argues that employment is less relevant for French youth chances of being residen-
tially emancipated (especially for men) since market income is often combined with
public beneﬁts and family help.
In short, Figure 2 shows that the sequence of events is diﬀerent in each country
and its possible consequences on the economic well-being of young people are so as
well.
4.3 Youth employment and poverty
In order to analyse the relationship between youth employment and poverty, we have
computed the poverty risk of all individuals according to a household categorisation
that takes into account the reference person age, his/her employment status, the
presence of young individuals in the household and whether they have a job or not.9
We strictly follow the idea developed by Cant´ o and Mercader (2001b).10
First columns of Table 1 show the poverty risk of individuals living in a household
9The reference person in the ECHP is appointed by the household and it does not necessarily
refer to the main income receiver but rather to the household head.
10See Cant´ o and Mercader (2001b), Table 9.5., p. 227.
10where the reference person is young. Unsurprisingly, the poverty risk is in mean
around 5 times higher when the young individual is not employed than when is so.
Employment proves once more to be a crucial protective factor against poverty.
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
The eﬀect of the presence of young people on their household poverty risk, shown
in the rest of columns, very much depends on the employment status of youth. While
nearly in every country the presence of not employed youth increases the chances
of being poor, as opposed to households without young members, the poverty risk
strongly decreases with youth employment, being the eﬀect especially clear in house-
holds where the reference person is not employed. Notice nevertheless that even
when this help-eﬀect follows the same pattern in each of the analysed countries in
terms of poverty reduction, it is much more common in Italy, Spain and Ireland —
see the percentages of individuals in each household type.11 In the just mentioned
countries, remaining in the parental home while preparing the emancipation does
not only beneﬁt the young individual but also his/her progenitors in what can be
seen as a family win-win strategy.12
5 An econometric model of feedback eﬀects bet-
ween poverty, employment and leaving home
decisions
To study the described relationships between poverty, employment and leaving home
decisions among European youth, we propose the estimation of a dynamic random-
eﬀects trivariate probit model that allows for feedback eﬀects between the three
11For the Spanish case, Cant´ o and Mercader (2001a) have been amongst the ﬁrst to describe a
help-eﬀect that works from youth to parents especially in households where the head is unemployed
or inactive. Similarly, Iacovou and Davia (2005) observe how it is in Southern Europe where adult
children are more likely to be economically supporting their parents. Further, Kluve (2002) ﬁnds
that in Southern Europe parents’ ﬁnancial satisfaction decreases when their young children leave
their home while the contrary is found in Northern Europe.
12See Ayll´ on (2009) for an analysis of the increasing help-eﬀect provided by young people over
time in Spain,
11processes. We have chosen this model because it allows us to deal with the un-
realistic assumption that each of the processes has no inﬂuence on future values
of the outcomes — e.g. past poverty having no eﬀect on current employment or
past employment on current emancipation status. As a ﬁrst-order Markov chain
model, it allows estimating state dependence for each outcome and spill-over eﬀects
between the processes which assesses whether youth are confronted with a sequen-
tial process of decision making or not.13 Furthermore, the model controls for initial
conditions and unobserved heterogeneity by following Wooldridge (2005) and allows
free correlation between unobservables aﬀecting each of the outcomes.
A similar econometric strategy has been applied before in diﬀerent poverty anal-
ysis.14 Biewen (2004, 2008) is main reference to us. The author models poverty,
employment and the decision to live with others amongst the adult population in
Germany. Among other results, he ﬁnds that there is a considerable amount of
genuine state dependence in the poverty status and that past poverty reduces the
probability of employment in the future while has a positive eﬀect on living alone
(or household split). Yet, his model is limited by the use of a common individual
speciﬁc random eﬀect which restricts the cross-process unobserved correlation struc-
ture (Biewen, 2008, p. 13). In our case, we overcome this constraint by allowing
random eﬀects to be diﬀerent in each equation and freely correlated thus making the
model more ﬂexible. Conceptually, we also ﬁnd it easier to think that unobservables
aﬀecting poverty are diﬀerent from those aﬀecting employment or emancipation.
Devicienti and Poggi (2007) assess how poverty and social exclusion interact
at the individual level in Italy. Their results on feedback eﬀects show how both
processes are aﬀected by an important degree of state dependence and also how both
phenomena reinforce each other. Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2006), on
the other hand, examine the poverty implications of past and current temporary
13Mart´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) have modelled before the relationships between
leaving parental home, entering the labour market and pursuing studies in the Spanish case. Yet,
they assume that the three decisions are taken at the same point in time which we ﬁnd unrealistic.
As shown below, the completion of a process (e.g. employment) is for many individuals a necessary
condition for entering another process (e.g. emancipation) in given contexts.
14Other applications not devoted to poverty analysis can be found in Alessie, Hochguertel, and
Van Soest (2004) that studies the dynamics of risky ﬁnancial assets ownership or Stewart (2007)
for the interrelationship between unemployment and low-pay in Britain.
12employment in Spain. They ﬁnd that holding a temporary contract increases not
only the probability of current poverty but also of future poverty via an indirect
eﬀect that increases the chances of holding a type of contract in the future with
higher poverty risk.15
In what follows, we focus ﬁrst on the model speciﬁcation. We discuss next the
inclusion of the diﬀerent feedback eﬀects and ﬁnally the main model advantages and
drawbacks.
5.1 Model speciﬁcation
Let’s deﬁne Pit as the individual poverty status of young individuals (measured at
the household level), Eit the employment status in the labour market and Lit the
emancipation status. We assume that in period t individuals can be characterised
by a latent poverty propensity p∗
it, a latent employment propensity e∗
it and an eman-
cipation propensity l∗
it that take the form:
p
∗
it = β0Eit + β1Lit + β2Pit−1 + β3Eit−1 + β4Lit−1 + β5Z
0
it + ci + uit (1)
e
∗
it = α0Lit + α1Pit−1 + α2Eit−1 + α3Lit−1 + α4S
0
it + hi + it (2)
l
∗
it = γ0Pit−1 + γ1Eit−1 + γ2Lit−1 + γ3V
0
it + gi + λit (3)
Pit = I(p
∗
it  0) (4)
Eit = I(e
∗
it  0) (5)
Lit = I(l
∗
it  0) (6)
where i = 1,2,...,N refers to young individuals and t = 1,...T are the number of
periods under study. I(p∗
it)  0, I(e∗
it)  0 and I(l∗
it)  0 are binary indicator
functions equal to one if the latent propensity in each case is positive and equal to






it) are the independent variables vectors assumed
to be exogenous, (β0,β1,β2,β3,β4,α0,α1,α2,α3,γ0,γ1,γ2) are the feedback eﬀects we
15Interestingly, the equation that models work status and type of contract is run by means of a
multinomial logit. Unfortunately, they do not take into account living arrangements and therefore
some of their results are driven by this fact — e.g. they ﬁnd that a temporary contract is not
signiﬁcant in explaining poverty among young males, the reason being that most of them live in
the parental home.
13are interested in (see below) and, generally called, (β5,α4,γ3) the rest of parameters
to be estimated. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic error terms in each process (uit, it
and λit) are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution with zero mean and
unit variance and to be serially independent.
As already well established in the literature, the treatment of initial conditions
is crucial in the estimation of dynamic panel data models as the one proposed in
equations 1 to 3.16 The problem of initial conditions arises because the start of the
observation window may not be the same than the start of the outcome experience.
Just as in Biewen (2004, 2008) and Devicienti and Poggi (2007), we have chosen to
follow Wooldridge (2005) on the treatment of initial conditions. The author proposes
to ﬁnd the density of the dependent variables from t = 1,...,T conditional on the
initial condition and the explanatory variables — instead of ﬁnding the density for
the whole period t = 0,1,...,T given the explanatory variables. This implies the need
to specify the density of the unobseved speciﬁc eﬀects conditional on the dependent
variables at t = 0 and the time-averaged explanatory variables, called generally Zit,
Sit and Vit.17 Formally, we can write the speciﬁcation as follows,
ci = a0 + a1Pi0 + a2Ei0 + a3Li0 + a4Zit + κ1i (7)
hi = b0 + b1Pi0 + b2Ei0 + b3Li0 + b4Sit + κ2i (8)
gi = x0 + x1Pi0 + x2Ei0 + x3Li0 + x4Vit + κ3i (9)
Following Stewart (2007), we add the time-averaged of some observed variables
in order to allow for a correlation between the individual speciﬁc eﬀects and the
time-varying variables (see also Chamberlain, 1984 and Alessie, Hochguertel, and
Van Soest, 2004).18
16See Hsiao (1986), Wooldridge (2005) and Chay and Hyslop (2000) for a review of the diﬀerent
strategies that have dealt with the initial conditions problem. Alessie, Hochguertel, and Van Soest
(2004) approach, for instance, would imply to estimate three separate static equations for each
outcome in the initial period Pi0, Ei0, Li0 and allow free cross-equation correlations. We ﬁnd their
methodology computationally diﬃcult if we take into account that we have three outcomes under
study and overall we would need to estimate a hexa-variate probit. Plus, and as recommended by
Heckman (1981), initial conditions should be instrumented with background information which is
very scarce in the case of the ECHP.
17In Biewen (2008), initial conditions are only included in the ﬁrst equation as only one random
eﬀect is speciﬁed. We considered the need to introduce initial conditions in each equation as each
includes an individual speciﬁc error.
18Stewart (2007) includes the average of all the model time-varying covariates except for feed-
14The joint density of the three outcomes {Pi1,...,PiT;Ei1,...,EiT;Li1,...,LiT} given
the exogenous variables (Zit,Sit,Vit), the initial values (Zi0,Si0,Vi0) and the indi-










Φ[(2 − Pit)(β0Eit + β1Lit + β2Pit−1 + β3Eit−1 + β4Lit−1 + β5Z
0
it +
+a0 + a1Pi0 + a2Ei0 + a3Li0 + a4Zit + κ1i)] ·
·Φ[(2 − Eit)(α0Lit + α1Pit−1 + α2Eit−1 + α3Lit−1 + α4S
0
it +
+b0 + b1Pi0 + b2Ei0 + b3Li0 + b4Sit + κ2i)] ·
·Φ[(2 − Lit)(γ0Pit−1 + γ1Eit−1 + γ2Lit−1 + γ3V
0
it +
+x0 + x1Pi0 + x2Ei0 + x3Li0 + x4Vit + κ3i)](10)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribu-
tion. Estimates of the model’s parameters are obtained by Conditional Maximum
Likelihood (CML).19 Moreover, the recursive structure assures identiﬁcation by
providing a multiplicity of exclusion restrictions as discussed in Mroz and Savage
(2006).
Following Wooldridge (2000, 2005) and in order to get consistent estimates,
the residuals κ1i, κ2i, κ3i are integrated out using a numerical integration algorithm
based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 12 points — though we checked how results
did not change when using 6 or 24.20 A trivariate normal distribution with zero mean
back eﬀects and year dummies. Wooldridge (2000) also underlines the importance of including
interaction terms so that the model is saturated. Following Biewen (2008) we introduced interac-
tions between the initial conditions and also with some observed values yet, it made no diﬀerence
on the results and we decided to exclude them from the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
19As argued in the aML software package User’s Guide: ”When a closed form solution to the
integral does not exist, the likelihood may be computed by approximating the normal integral by
a weighted sum over ’conditional likekihoods,’ i.e., likelihoods conditional on certain well-chosen
values of the residual” (aML User’s Guide, 2003, p. 130.) The alternative would be to use
Maximum Simulated Likelihood (see Alessie, Hochguertel, and Van Soest, 2004; Devicienti and
Poggi, 2007 or Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice, 2004).
20The algorithm selects a number of support points and weights such that the weighted points
approximate the normal distribution (see aML User’s Guide, 2003).
15and σ2
kji variance is assumed for κ1i, κ2i, κ3i which moreover are allowed to be freely
correlated:
ρ12 = corr(κ1i,κ2i) (11)
ρ13 = corr(κ1i,κ3i) (12)
ρ23 = corr(κ2i,κ3i) (13)
where ρ12 summarises the association between unobservable individual factors de-
termining poverty status and employment. If ρ12 is positive (negative) it means
that those individuals more likely to be poor are also more (less) likely to be em-
ployed. Furthermore, ρ13 accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between poverty
and leaving home. When positive (negative) it means that unobservables that make
young people more likely to be poor make them more (less) likely to be emancipated.
And, ﬁnally, ρ23 which relates unobserved heterogeneity between employment and
emancipation. If positive, it means that unobserved characteristics that make youth
more likely to be employed also make them more likely to be emancipated (e.g.
intelligence, career driven, etc.). If negative, the other way round.
5.2 State dependence and feedback eﬀects
As for state dependence, in the poverty equation, we include as explanatory variables
poverty status at t − 1 with the idea of capturing the sign and degree of true state
dependence in the poverty status once observed and unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for. As argued by Weber (2002) and Devicienti and Poggi (2007), if
we would not consider unobserved heterogeneity, true state dependence would be
overestimated. We expect genuine state dependence in the poverty status to be
positive everywhere. Yet, the coeﬃcient of the poverty status at the initial year
should point to the fact that persistence seems to be longer lasting in Mediterranean
countries as opposed to Nordic ones. Recall Figure 1 in the descriptive section.
In terms of feedback eﬀects, the poverty equation includes as explanatory vari-
able whether the individual has left the parental home or not. According to the
descriptive statistics, we should not ﬁnd great diﬀerences of the poverty risk among
emancipated and non emancipated youth in Mediterranean countries while much
16more so in Nordic ones. Yet, lagged emancipation status should reﬂect the fact that
poverty decreases at a fast rate for Finns and Danish. And, ﬁnally, employment and
lagged employment is included in the equation from which we expect a negative sign
— both for emancipated and non emancipated youth.
In terms of the employment equation, and following the sequential conditioning
structure proposed in Biewen (2004), we include as explanatory variables lagged
employment status, current and lagged emancipation status and lagged poverty sta-
tus.21 From lagged employment status we expect a positive sign in all the analysed
countries as state dependence in employment is signiﬁcant in the labour market (see
Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor, 2000; Stewart, 2007 and Heckman, 1981). More-
over, we count on a positive inﬂuence of emancipation status (current and lagged)
on employment given a higher level of individual income is necessary to support
oneself outside the parental home. Yet, as shown in Figure 2, emancipation does
not necessarily have any inﬂuence on the employment status of Scandinavian youth.
Less clear is, as yet, the inﬂuence of lagged poverty status on the inﬂuence of
employment. On the one hand, amongst those living in the parental home, one
may think that economic hardship may precipitate young individuals to enter the
labour market in order to help his/her family. If that would be the case, we could
anticipate a positive sign between lagged poverty and current employment. On the
other hand, it is also well known that poverty is intergenerationally transmitted
thus individuals from an economic deprived background have less opportunities in
the labour market. If this eﬀect is strong, we can expect a negative sign — possibly,
less strong in Nordic countries where the intergenerational transmission of poverty
is highly mediated by more egalitarian educational systems and policies (see, for
21We have indeed chosen to model employment in the second equation rather than emancipation
as we preferred the eﬀect of current emancipation status on employment than the other way
round — yet results went into the same direction when we did so. Furthermore, in Biewen (2008)
the sequential conditioning scheme proposed in the earlier version of the paper (2004) by which
outcome 3 enters as explanatory variable in equation 2 is replaced for a bivariate probit scheme
where outcome 2 and 3 do not enter as explanatory variables in equations 3 and 2, respectively,
and thus, both outcomes are treated symmetrically. We have chosen to include the emancipation
status in the employment equation because we are interested in the eﬀect of leaving home in labour
market decisions. However, we checked that the rest of the results did not change much when we
modelled a symmetric structure. Indeed, Biewen (2008) also underlines that the general results do
not depend on this choice of speciﬁcation. Moreover, note that in any case, we are not modelling a
fully simultaneous model thus the consistency of our estimates is guaranteed (see Maddala, 1983).
17instance, J¨ antti et al., 2006).
And, ﬁnally, as for the leaving home equation, we have included only lagged
employment, emancipation and poverty statuses. As before we expect lagged em-
ployment to be positively related with emancipation — though not necessarily sig-
niﬁcant in Nordic countries where employment is not an inevitable condition for
emancipation. Furthermore, we expect a highly signiﬁcant and positive sign for
lagged emancipation status measuring state dependence outside the parental home,
as ’come-backs’ are rare in the analysed countries.22 And, ﬁnally, the inﬂuence of
lagged poverty status on leaving home decisions is diﬃcult to predict. In the de-
scriptive analysis of Section 4 it was argued that economic hardship in the family of
origin does not seem to precipitate leaving parental home. Yet, an explanation for
it is diﬃcult to disentangle. In those contexts where family ties are strong, young
individuals may feel more responsible about their parental well-being and thus re-
main in the parental home to oﬀer help and companionship. On the other hand,
individuals from poorer background may not only have fewer opportunities in the
labour market but also emancipation possibilities.
Notice that if β3 = β4 = α1 = α3 = γ0 = γ1 = 0, the recursive structure
of the proposed model would not be necessary and we could consistently estimate
the three equations separately with three univariate random-eﬀects dynamic models
with unobserved heterogeneity. If the mentioned coeﬃcients would be diﬀerent from
zero but ρ12 = ρ13 = ρ23 = 0, again, we could estimate the equations separately
by assuming that the lagged values of each outcome used as explanatory variable
are weakly exogenous. Otherwise, joint estimation is necessary in order to obtain
consistent estimates, as argued.
5.3 Model advantages and drawbacks
One of the main advantages of this dynamic model is that it allows estimating state
dependence while distinguishing between genuine state dependence in each poverty,
22We were concerned about the possible diﬃculties arising from estimating a probit model with
unobserved heterogeneity for leaving home given the small variability in the data. However, the
inclusion of the lagged variable assured that estimates did not change much even when increasing
importantly the number of quadrature points.
18employment and emancipation status (β2,α2,λ2, respectively) and unobserved het-
erogeneity related to each outcome (ci, hi and gi). Poverty genuine state dependence
occurs because poverty in a given year may in itself increase the probability of be-
ing poor next year. Unobserved heterogeneity would explain persistence in a given
status because those characteristics which make someone poor exhibit persistence
over time. Further, the model estimates spill-over eﬀects by separating dependence
between outcomes (β0,β1,β2,β3,β4,α0,α1,α2,α3,γ0,γ1,γ2) from correlated unob-
served heterogeneity.
Note the importance for policy design of distinguishing genuine state dependence
from observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Both phenomena can explain why
an individual is consecutively poor but, as pointed out by Devicienti and Poggi
(2007), if state dependence exists and it is positive, policies aimed at ﬁghting youth
poverty today are eﬀective in reducing poverty tomorrow. If feedback eﬀects are
true, improving the chances of young people in the labour market will have spill-
over eﬀects on the reduction of youth poverty. Instead, if poverty is mainly due to
unobserved heterogeneity it will be very hard for social policy to tackle it.
Another important advantage of the model is that it allows attrition to depend
on the initial conditions in an arbitrary way. The MLE allows a diﬀerent attrition
probability depending on the initial value of each of the outcomes. Thus, attrition
is taken into account without need to explicitly model it.23
As argued by Biewen (2004, 2008), not allowing for serial correlation in the
idiosyncratic error terms is a limitation of this kind of model but it would be ex-
ceedingly diﬃcult to estimate it given the multiple equations structure of the current
model. However, it opens an interesting avenue for future research.24
23See Cappellari and Jenkins (2002, 2004), for a methodology on poverty transitions that ex-
plicitly models sample retention.
24See Hyslop (1999) for an analysis of labour force participation of married women with a
random-eﬀects dynamic model that accounts for initial conditions, unobserved heterogeneity and
also autocorrelation in the transitory error component or Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) in
a study of individual health using similar techniques.
196 Empirical results
We present our empirical ﬁndings by focusing ﬁrst on the results related to un-
observed heterogeneity and its correlations. Next, we move to a discussion of our
ﬁndings relative to state dependence and feedback eﬀects. To ease interpretation,
we also present results as average partial eﬀects (APE) which show, in absolute
terms, the impact of a change in an explanatory variable on the risk of poverty,
employment or emancipation.25 For example, the average partial eﬀect of genuine
state dependence in the poverty status is formally given by,
APE = E[P(Pit=1|Eit,Lit,Pit−1 = 1,Eit−1,Lit−1,Pi0,Ei0,Li0,Zit) −
−(Pit=1|Eit,Lit,Pit−1 = 0,Eit−1,Lit−1,Pi0,Ei0,Li0,Zit)] (14)
with the expectation being over all characteristics indexed by i. And consistently
estimated by,




















































where superscript o is used to denote that the original parameter estimated have
been multiplied by (1 + c σci
2)(−1/2).26
6.1 Unobserved heterogeneity and correlations
The estimated standard deviations of the random eﬀects and their correlations are
presented in Table 2. Importantly, the standard deviations for all random eﬀects
are statistically signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence level (except for one in the case of
Ireland) which emphasizes the importance of considering unobserved heterogeneity
in the present analysis.
25Note we have only computed APE for underlying coeﬃcients statistically signiﬁcant at least
at 95% conﬁdence level.
26Multiplying by this constant does make the results comparable with other econometric strate-
gies such as pooled probit (see Arulampalam, 1999) and also it allows comparison with Biewen
(2008).
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Table 2 also presents the free correlations between unobservables. Recall that
the signiﬁcance of the correlations highlights the importance of estimating the three
processes jointly. As can be seen, except for Ireland, in all countries, there is at least
one correlation being signiﬁcant. Yet, results also underline that not everywhere the
three processes are similarly interlinked through unobserved heterogeneity. That
is, the sequencing scheme does ﬁt better certain contexts (namely Continental and
Mediterranean countries) compare to others (Ireland or Finland).27
Unobserved factors driving poverty are negatively associated with those that
drive employment in Germany and United Kingdom, and less strongly, in Denmark
and Finland. It is reasonable to think that unobservables that make individuals
more likely to be poor also reduce their chances to be employed. Interestingly, this
same correlation is not signiﬁcant in Mediterranean countries. Any interpretation of
this result is diﬃcult, yet it is possible to think that in strong family ties countries,
young people may feel forced to enter the labour market in order to help their
families out of poverty. And, as a result, oﬀ-set the diﬃculties they encounter when
looking for a job.28
On the other hand, only in Spain and France, unobservable factors that drive
poverty also drive emancipation. Actually, Parisi (2008) also proves for Southern
Europe that, controlling for observed factors, the more likely is a young person to
leave home, the more likely is to be poor once emancipated. Diﬀerently, we did not
ﬁnd such clear evidence in the case of Italy.
Finally, unobservables that make someone more likely to be employed also make
him/her more likely to leave parental home in Mediterranean Europe — e.g. will for
self-suﬃciency, career driven, etc. Interestingly, the same is not true in Continental
Europe. Actually, unobservable factors driving employment are negatively related
27Notice however, that in the case of Finland we only have data for the period 1996 to 2000.
28See Cant´ o and Mercader (2001b, 2001b) and Mart´ ınez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) for
the argument that in Spain the inter-generational family provides support not only from parents
to children but also from children to parents. Furthermore, Iacovou and Davia (2005) conclude
that it is in the Southern European countries that adult children are most likely to be supporting
their parents.
21with factors driving emancipation which highlights the fact that many Germans and
French leave parental home for other reasons than employment.
6.2 Poverty
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters of main interest — the full speciﬁcation
of the model and standard errors are shown in Table A.1 of the Appendix.29 First
rows show the results of the poverty equation. As expected, poverty status at t − 1
is positive and highly signiﬁcant in each of the analysed countries which proves
the existence of a positive poverty genuine state dependence eﬀect. As among the
adult population, being poor today increases in itself the chances of being poor
tomorrow also for young people. APE in Table 4 indicate that poverty genuine
state dependence goes from 16 to 32 percentage points.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Yet, the nature of the poverty experience is very diﬀerent depending on the
institutional context. Danish and Finns do face problems of economic hardship
during their youth however results show it is a situation of more temporary nature
as the coeﬃcient for P0 is smaller than for Pt−1. Instead, in Mediterranean Europe,
young people face more diﬃculties to escape poverty. As a matter of fact, the
scarring eﬀect of poverty increases with time which points to poverty experiences
more persistent in nature — being the results especially clear in Spain, Italy and
Ireland. Youth may be a temporary phase in the life cycle yet these results show
poverty is not. The cases of Germany, France and United Kingdom lie in between.
Results also show how being outside the parental home is strongly associated with
poverty in Finland and Denmark, but also in the rest of countries except for the
Mediterranean ones where the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. In Finland, for instance,
emancipation implies an increase in the poverty risk of 48.6%. Notice however, how
in most countries (except Italy), the sign reverses and becomes negative for those
29As Mroz and Savage (2006) argue, the estimates can be interpreted as the impact of exogenously
induced changes in the possibly endogenous determinants.
22that have been away from the parental home at least for two years (Lt−1). This result
highlights the temporality of economic hardship because of emancipation lived by
Finns and Danish, but also Germans, French or British.30 In Spain and Italy, we do
not ﬁnd evidence of diﬀerences statistically signiﬁcant between the poverty risk of
leavers and stayers (see Mendola, Busetta, and Aassve, 2008, for a similar result). As
argued, Mediterranean youth do not leave parental home until they can guarantee
themselves a suﬃcient standard of living.31
As for the labour market, unsurprisingly, we ﬁnd current and lagged employment
to be signiﬁcant and negatively related with the poverty status — being in Finland,
France and Ireland where the eﬀect is the strongest. Yet, the eﬀect of employment
on current poverty seems limited in terms of time as coeﬃcients lose importance
and may even reverse the sign.
The signiﬁcance of the rest of variables that control for age, sex, region at the
initial period or time varies depending on the context.32
6.3 Employment
As for the results in the employment equation, the only common coeﬃcient being
signiﬁcant across all countries is the one capturing genuine state dependence in
the employment status which is positive and signiﬁcant, as expected. The highest
genuine state dependence in the employment status is found in Germany and Italy
and the weakest in Finland and Ireland. For instance, in Germany, past employment
increases by 29 percentage points the likelihood of current employment among young
people — this is slightly lower than the one found by Biewen (2008) among German
men aged 26 to 65 (33%).
30In Aassve et al. (2007) it is argued that Nordic youth perceive that the time in economic
hardship will be short given the dynamism of youth labour markets and the generosity of the
Welfare States and thus emancipation is the result of a rational decision.
31It is also true that young people in Mediterranean countries mostly leave parental home to
live with a partner, thus, beneﬁting from the economies of scale of partnering. Notice also how the
sign of leaving home in the initial period is positive and signiﬁcant in Spain probably pointing out
at the diﬃculties encountered by those that left parental home in their early youth. As noted by
Parisi (2008), the later youth leave parental home the less likely are to enter poverty when they
do leave. Similarly, in Italy, the sign for past emancipation status is positive and signiﬁcant, most
likely explained by young people starting to be engaged in childbearing.
32Note controls for education are necessarily left out of the regressions in order to avoid problems
of endogeneity with leaving home.
23On the other hand, current emancipation status is not signiﬁcant in Scandinavia
and the English-speaking countries pointing out that employment and emancipation
are not so interlinked phenomena. Conversely, in Continental and Mediterranean
Europe the association between emancipation and employment is strong: leaving
parental home increases the incentives to seek employment. Surprisingly, though,
the coeﬃcient for lagged emancipation status on employment is negative in Spain,
Italy and France. Separate regressions by gender show that these results are driven
by females who are less likely to be employed once they have been emancipated at
least for two years and may be engaged in childbearing.
As for the inﬂuence of lagged poverty on employment, we were not sure whether
to expect a positive sign — indicating that young individuals precipitate to the
labour market to help their families out of economic hardship — or a negative one —
pointing out a certain degree of intergenerational poverty transmission. Our results
show that the eﬀect of poverty being transmitted across generations dominates and
takes the form of lesser opportunities in the labour market. In Italy, for instance,
past poverty reduces the chances of employment in the labour market by 7.5%.
However, notice how the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant in Finland and less precisely
estimated in Denmark conforming to the well-known fact that the transmission of
poverty across generations is less important in these countries.
Finally, girls are less likely to be employed in all the countries and age follows
the usual inverted U-shape.
6.4 Emancipation
As expected, having left the parental home in the emancipation equation is positive
and one of the most signiﬁcant coeﬃcients across equations. Young people that
decide to leave the parental home are only in rare occasions coming back to it.
Yet, it is in Ireland and in the Mediterranean countries where state dependence in
the emancipation status is the strongest. Conversely, in Finland and Denmark the
decision to leave the parental home is much more determined by age than by past
emancipation decisions.
Lagged employment status is positive in Mediterranean and Continental Europe
24indicating that employment is a prerequisite to emancipation, especially among
males.33 Finally, and in relation to lagged poverty status, interestingly, the coeﬃ-
cient is negative and signiﬁcant only in France and Italy while not precisely estimated
in the other strong family ties country as Spain.34 In France and Italy, poverty de-
lays emancipation while economic hardship in the family of origin does not among
Spaniards once other factors are controlled for.
Age is a strong determinant of leaving home decisions while girls are more likely
to leave parental home than boys — as already well established in the literature.
7 Conclusions
This paper studies the dynamics of youth poverty in eight European countries us-
ing data from the European Community Household Panel for the period 1994-2000.
Our main objective has been to separate genuine state dependence in the poverty
status from observed and unobserved characteristics. To explore the nature of youth
poverty, we have used a dynamic trivariate probit model with random eﬀects that
controls for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions while considers the pos-
sible endogeneity of employment and residential emancipation from the parental
home by allowing for feedback eﬀects and free correlation between random eﬀects.
We have followed the model proposed in Biewen (2004) but yet we have made the
error’s structure more ﬂexible by adding a diﬀerent random eﬀect in each of the
outcome equations.
Our results conﬁrm that there is a considerable amount of genuine state depen-
dence in the poverty status in all the analysed countries For instance, past poverty
increases the chances of being poor in Italy by 20% and nearly 32% in Denmark. Yet,
the coeﬃcient of initial poverty status also indicates that the poverty experiences
are very diﬀerent in nature depending on the institutional context. Thus, poverty
persistence is longer lasting in Mediterranean countries as opposed to Scandinavia.
33Results are not very apparent yet, note that the relationship between employment and eman-
cipation is already accounted for in the employment equation.
34Parisi (2008) also ﬁnds a negative association between family poverty at t and leaving home
at t+1 for a pooled regression for all Southern Europe countries available at the ECHP. However,
interaction terms with country show that coeﬃcients are not precisely estimated for Spain.
25Germany, France and United Kingdom lie in between while Ireland behaves very
much as a Mediterranean country. Genuine state dependence in the employment
and emancipation status is positive and strong, as expected.
The results of the estimation suggest the importance of the feedback eﬀects con-
sidered — though with diﬀerent results in diﬀerent institutional contexts. First,
emancipation has proven to have barely any eﬀect on poverty in Italy and Spain
while important and positive in the rest of countries (especially in Finland and Den-
mark). Yet, in Scandinavian countries, the inﬂuence of emancipation on poverty is
limited in terms of time as the sign for lagged emancipation status becomes negative.
That is, emancipation increases the chances of being poor but not for a long time.
Second, poverty decreases the chances of youth employment everywhere (except
Finland) between 4 and 8 percentage points. Third, employment and emancipation
are very close phenomena in Spain and Italy but also in Germany and France. In
Scandinavian countries and in the English-speaking ones such a link does not seem
to exist. And, ﬁnally, past poverty has a negative inﬂuence on emancipation yet
evidence of such strong family ties seems limited only to Italy and France.
As for the model speciﬁcation, results conﬁrm the importance of considering
unobserved heterogeneity and the correlations between random-eﬀects. Yet, the
link between the three estimated processes via unobservables is not equally strong
in all countries. Actually, it is in Mediterranean and Continental Europe where a
joint model of the kind presented here is more relevant.
Results call therefore for two type of policies aimed at ﬁghting youth poverty.
On the one hand, income policies that rise youth (or their family) incomes above the
poverty line would avoid the scarring eﬀect of poverty on future economic hardship.
And, on the other hand, policies that enhance those characteristics observed to have
an eﬀect against poverty via employment or smoother residential transition.
There are several ways in which the results found in this paper can be extended.
Some of the avenues for future research have already been commented along the text
such as the incorporation of serially temporarily correlated error terms but also the
introduction of second order lags. Another possible extension would be to model the
diﬀerent destinations of young people when leaving parental home or the scarring
26eﬀect of unemployment periods on the likelihood of poverty and leaving home.
27References
Aassve, A., M. A. Davia, M. Iacovou, and S. Mazzuco (2007): “Does
leaving home make you poor? Evidence from 13 European countries,” Journal of
Population Economics, 23, 315–338.
Aassve, A., M. A. Davia, M. Iacovou, and L. Mencarini (2005): “Poverty
and the transition to adulthood: Risky situations and risky events,” Working
Paper 2005-23, ISER.
Aassve, A., M. Iacovou, and L. Mencarini (2006): “Youth poverty and tran-
sition to adulthood in Europe,” Demographic Research, 15(2), 19–50.
Alessie, R., A. Brugiavini, and G. Weber (2006): “Saving and cohabitation:
The economic consequences of living with ones own parents in Italy and the
Netherlands,” in NBER International seminar on Macroeconomics 2004, ed. by
R. H. Clarida, J. A. Frankel, F. Giavazzi, and K. D. West. Cambridge: The MIT
Press.
Alessie, R., S. Hochguertel, and A. Van Soest (2004): “Ownership of stocks
and mutual funds: A panel data analysis,” The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 86(3), 783–796.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and R. Serrano-Padial (2006): “Labour market ﬂex-
ibility and poverty dynamics: Evidence from Spain,” unpublished Working Paper.
Arulampalam, W. (1999): “Practitioners’corner. A note on estimated coeﬃcients
in random eﬀects probit models,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
61(4), 597–602.
Arulampalam, W., A. Booth, and M. Taylor (2000): “Unemployment per-
sistence,” Oxford Economic Papers, 52(1), 24–50.
Ayll´ on, S. (2009): “Poverty and living arrangements among youth in Spain, 1980-
2005,” Demographic Research, 20(17), 403–434.
28Biewen, M. (2004): “Measuring state dependence in individual poverty status.
Are there feedback eﬀects to employment decisions and household composition?,”
IZA Discussion Papers 1138, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
(2008): “Measuring state dependence in individual poverty histories when
there is feedback to employment status and household composition,” Paper pre-
sented at the 20th EALE Annual Conference, Amsterdam, Holland, September
18-20 2008, forthcoming Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Cant´ o, O., and M. Mercader (2001a): “Pobreza y familia: son los j´ ovenes una
carga o una ayuda?,” Papeles de Econom´ ıa Espa˜ nola, 88, 151–165.
(2001b): “Young people leaving home: the impact on poverty in Spain,” in
The Dynamics of Child Poverty in Industrialised Countries, ed. by B. Bradbury,
S. Jenkins, and J. Micklewright. UNICEF, Cambridge University Press.
Cappellari, L., and S. P. Jenkins (2002): “Who stays poor? Who becomes
poor? Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey,” The Economic Jour-
nal, 112(478), C60–C67.
(2004): “Modelling low income transitions,” Journal of Applied Economet-
rics, 19, 593–610.
Chamberlain, G. (1984): “Panel Data,” in Handbook of Econometrics, ed. by
Z. Giliches, and M. Intriligator, vol. 2, pp. 1247–1318. Amsterdam, North Holland.
Chay, K. Y., and D. Hyslop (2000): “Identiﬁcation and estimation of dy-
namic binary response panel data models: Empirical evidence using alternative
approaches,” unpublished Working Paper.
Contoyannis, P., A. M. Jones, and N. Rice (2004): “Simulation-based in-
ference in dynamic panel probit models: An application to health,” Empirical
Economics, 29, 49–77.
Debels, A., and L. Vandecasteele (2008): “The time lag in annual household-
based income measures: assessing and correction the bias,” Review of Income and
Wealth, 54(1), 71–88.
29Devicienti, F., and A. Poggi (2007): “Poverty and social exclusion: two sides
of the same coin or dynamically interrelated processes?,” Working Paper 62, Lab-
oratorio R. Revelli.
Heckman, J. J. (1981): “Heterogeneity and state dependence,” in Studies in Labor
Markets, ed. by S. Rosen, pp. 91–139. The University of Chicago Press.
Hobcraft, J. (2003): “Continuity and change in pathways to young adult disad-
vantage. Results from a British Birth Cohort,” CASEpaper 56, Centre for Analysis
of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics.
Hsiao, C. (1986): Analysis of panel data. Cambridge University Press.
Hyslop, D. R. (1999): “State dependence, serial correlation and heterogeneity in
intertemporal labor force participation of married women,” Econometrica, 67(6),
1255–1294.
Iacovou, M., and A. Aassve (2007): Youth poverty in Europe. Joseph Rowntree
Foundation.
Iacovou, M., and R. Berthoud (2003): “Employment and poverty among young
people. A European perspective,” Representing Children, 15(4), 258–270.
Iacovou, M., and M. A. Davia (2005): “Who supports whom? Co-residence
between young adults and their parents,” Paper presented at the EPUNet Con-
ference 2006, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, May 8-9 2006.
J¨ antti, M., K. Red, R. Naylor, A. Bjrklund, B. Bratsberg, O. Raaum,
E. ¨ Osterbacka, and T. Eriksson (2006): “American exceptionalism in a
new light: A comparison of intergenerational earnings mobility in the Nordic
Countries, the United Kingdom and the United States,” Discussion Paper 1938,
Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.
Jenkins, S. P. (2000): “Modelling household income dynamics,” Journal of Pop-
ulation Economics, 13, 529–567.
30Jurado Guerrero, T. (2001): Youth in transition. Housing, employment, social
policies and families in France and Spain. Ashgate.
Kangas, O., and P. Palme (2000): “Does social policy matter? Poverty cycles
in OECD countries,” International Journal of Health Services, 30(2), 335–352.
Kluve, J. (2002): “Why not stay home? Determinants of nest-leaving behaviour
in Germany and Spain,” unpublished Working Paper, UC Berkeley.
Maddala, G. (1983): Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in Econometrics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mart´ ınez-Granado, M., and J. Ruiz-Castillo (2002): “The decisions of
Spanish youth: A cross-section study,” Journal of Population Economics, 15,
305–330.
Mendola, D., A. Busetta, and A. Aassve (2008): “Poverty Permanence
Among European Youth,” ISER Working Papers 2008-04, Institute for Social
and Economic Research.
Middleton, S. (2002): “Transitions from youth to adulthood,” in Poverty and
Social Exclusion in Europe, ed. by M. Barnes, C. Heady, S. Middleton, J. Millar,
F. Papadopoulos, G. Room, and P. Tsakloglou. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mroz, T. A., and T. H. Savage (2006): “The long-term eﬀects of youth unem-
ployment,” Journal of Human Resources, XLI(2), 259–293.
Parisi, L. (2008): “Leaving home and the chances of being poor: the case of young
people in Southern European countries,” Labour, 22(special issue), 89–114.
Rigg, J., and T. Sefton (2004): “Income dynamics and the life cycle,” CASEpa-
per 81, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion and London School of Economics.
Stewart, M. B. (2007): “The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low-
wage employment,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(3), 511–531.
31Weber, A. (2002): “State dependence and wage dynamics. A heterogeneous
Markov chain model for wage mobility in Austria,” Economic Series 114, Institute
for Advanced Studies (Vienna).
Wooldridge, J. M. (2000): “A framework for estimating dynamic, unobserved
eﬀects panel data models with possible feedback to future explanatory variables,”
Economic Letters, 68, 245–250.
(2005): “Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic,
non linear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity,” Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 20, 39–54.












































Time of leaving parental home
Source: Own calculations on the ECHP, 1994-2001.












































































Source: Own calculations on the ECHP, 1994-2001.
34T
a
b
l
e
1
:
M
e
a
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
r
a
t
e
a
n
d
,
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
,
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
i
n
t
h
e
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
a
c
h
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
t
y
p
e
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
0
A
l
l
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
t
y
p
e
s
Y
o
u
n
g
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
A
d
u
l
t
o
r
e
l
d
e
r
l
y
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
W
o
r
k
s
N
o
t
a
t
w
o
r
k
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
w
o
r
k
s
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
w
o
r
k
N
o
y
o
u
t
h
S
o
m
e
y
o
u
t
h
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
N
o
y
o
u
t
h
S
o
m
e
y
o
u
t
h
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
N
o
y
o
u
t
h
S
o
m
e
y
o
u
t
h
N
o
y
o
u
t
h
S
o
m
e
y
o
u
t
h
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
S
p
a
i
n
1
8
.
9
1
1
.
7
4
1
.
9
1
4
.
6
2
0
.
7
8
.
8
2
8
.
3
4
2
.
5
1
6
.
9
[
1
1
.
0
]
[
3
.
2
]
[
2
8
.
0
]
[
1
6
.
1
]
[
1
6
.
9
]
[
1
6
.
6
]
[
5
.
1
]
[
3
.
2
]
I
t
a
l
y
1
8
.
9
1
7
.
2
4
3
.
8
1
2
.
6
2
7
.
2
1
1
.
4
1
9
.
1
4
2
.
0
1
3
.
5
[
5
.
8
]
[
1
.
1
]
[
2
6
.
0
]
[
1
6
.
2
]
[
1
2
.
8
]
[
2
1
.
3
]
[
6
.
6
]
[
1
0
.
3
]
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
9
.
8
4
.
5
2
9
.
8
2
.
5
5
.
6
2
.
4
2
6
.
0
1
9
.
6
4
.
4
[
1
4
.
4
]
[
4
.
7
]
[
3
7
.
7
]
[
8
.
3
]
[
9
.
1
]
[
2
2
.
7
]
[
1
.
6
]
[
1
.
5
]
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
1
0
.
0
5
.
9
4
3
.
7
5
.
2
4
.
5
2
.
3
1
9
.
2
2
3
.
7
4
.
6
[
1
2
.
5
]
[
3
.
9
]
[
4
1
.
5
]
[
1
0
.
7
]
[
6
.
3
]
[
2
2
.
0
]
[
2
.
0
]
[
1
.
0
]
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
1
1
.
7
7
.
0
3
2
.
2
6
.
8
6
.
6
2
.
9
2
0
.
3
3
1
.
3
6
.
7
[
9
.
5
]
[
3
.
5
]
[
3
1
.
3
]
[
7
.
9
]
[
1
0
.
2
]
[
2
8
.
3
]
[
3
.
8
]
[
5
.
5
]
F
r
a
n
c
e
1
4
.
6
1
0
.
3
5
4
.
4
8
.
6
1
4
.
2
6
.
6
2
1
.
6
3
8
.
1
1
5
.
9
[
1
2
.
1
]
[
2
.
2
]
[
3
2
.
1
]
[
1
2
.
9
]
[
9
.
3
]
[
2
4
.
5
]
[
3
.
5
]
[
3
.
4
]
U
K
1
7
.
0
1
0
.
3
5
5
.
4
6
.
6
1
3
.
1
2
.
9
2
8
.
3
4
6
.
8
1
1
.
9
[
8
.
6
]
[
4
.
8
]
[
3
0
.
3
]
[
5
.
0
]
[
9
.
7
]
[
3
3
.
3
]
[
3
.
9
]
[
4
.
3
]
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
1
9
.
0
8
.
3
6
7
.
2
8
.
8
1
4
.
5
3
.
9
4
3
.
5
4
5
.
4
6
.
8
[
7
.
8
]
[
3
.
3
]
[
2
7
.
2
]
[
9
.
5
]
[
1
5
.
5
]
[
1
8
.
2
]
[
7
.
8
]
[
1
0
.
7
]
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
w
n
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
E
C
H
P
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
.
Y
o
u
t
h
r
e
f
e
r
s
t
o
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
6
a
n
d
2
9
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
a
g
e
.
T
h
i
s
t
a
b
l
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
s
t
h
e
i
d
e
a
f
r
o
m
T
a
b
l
e
9
.
5
.
(
p
.
2
2
7
)
i
n
C
a
n
t
´
o
a
n
d
M
e
r
c
a
d
e
r
(
2
0
0
1
b
)
.
M
e
a
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
r
a
t
e
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
w
a
v
e
4
a
s
t
h
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
i
s
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
F
i
n
n
i
s
h
c
a
s
e
.
T
h
u
s
,
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
r
a
t
e
s
r
e
f
e
r
t
o
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
1
9
9
6
,
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
0
f
o
r
t
h
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
W
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
.
35T
a
b
l
e
2
:
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
r
a
n
d
o
m
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
r
a
n
d
o
m
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
t
r
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
o
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
e
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
K
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
σ
c
i
0
.
7
5
7
9
*
*
*
0
.
7
4
3
3
*
*
*
0
.
4
0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.
5
1
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
5
3
*
*
*
0
.
6
7
5
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
1
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
0
6
0
*
*
*
σ
h
i
0
.
8
1
6
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
9
2
2
*
*
*
0
.
4
6
1
3
*
*
*
0
.
5
6
9
8
*
*
*
0
.
6
8
9
5
*
*
*
0
.
6
4
9
2
*
*
*
0
.
7
7
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
8
5
2
4
*
*
*
σ
g
i
0
.
6
3
0
8
*
*
*
0
.
8
2
4
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
1
5
8
*
*
*
1
.
0
3
7
9
*
*
0
.
9
5
6
5
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
0
6
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
5
1
*
*
*
0
.
5
4
0
8
ρ
1
2
-
0
.
0
0
5
6
0
.
0
4
6
3
-
0
.
6
6
5
1
*
*
-
0
.
3
6
2
2
*
-
0
.
3
6
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
2
8
0
-
0
.
5
2
6
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
9
6
1
ρ
1
3
0
.
2
1
7
6
*
*
0
.
0
6
6
9
-
0
.
6
9
8
7
*
0
.
0
7
8
5
0
.
0
2
8
1
0
.
4
7
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
1
1
0
1
0
.
3
9
4
8
ρ
2
3
0
.
3
3
9
9
*
*
*
0
.
3
7
5
4
*
*
*
0
.
4
5
8
6
*
0
.
0
8
8
5
-
0
.
2
0
9
4
*
*
-
0
.
2
6
5
2
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
9
2
0
.
1
1
0
5
N
o
t
e
:
O
w
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
E
C
H
P
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
.
36T
a
b
l
e
3
:
C
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
t
r
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
o
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
e
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
P
O
V
E
R
T
Y
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
0
.
6
3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
9
7
*
*
*
1
.
1
2
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
8
9
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
3
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
8
6
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
9
9
4
*
*
*
0
.
8
6
6
9
*
*
*
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
=
0
1
.
1
1
8
1
*
*
*
1
.
0
9
6
5
*
*
*
0
.
3
5
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
8
2
2
7
*
*
*
1
.
1
1
0
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
1
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
8
7
8
2
*
*
*
1
.
1
8
4
5
*
*
*
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
0
.
1
3
2
1
-
0
.
0
0
7
4
2
.
2
8
6
7
*
*
*
2
.
4
5
0
1
*
*
*
1
.
3
2
4
6
*
*
*
0
.
9
5
5
8
*
*
*
1
.
5
3
9
0
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
7
3
*
*
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
2
1
4
0
.
2
0
6
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
7
1
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
9
5
9
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
7
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
6
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
5
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
=
0
0
.
2
9
6
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
2
7
-
0
.
5
3
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
9
2
1
*
*
-
0
.
2
1
3
7
*
*
-
0
.
1
1
0
4
-
0
.
1
8
3
8
0
.
0
2
1
7
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
-
0
.
4
9
0
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
3
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
7
5
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
8
7
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
1
3
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
1
5
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
0
3
4
*
*
*
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
1
5
7
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
7
4
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
0
8
5
-
0
.
3
1
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
8
3
-
0
.
3
9
7
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
7
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
4
8
*
*
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
=
0
0
.
0
3
3
5
0
.
1
4
0
9
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
4
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
0
-
0
.
2
0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
6
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
6
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
1
9
0
*
*
*
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
-
0
.
1
7
8
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
2
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
8
5
-
0
.
2
2
2
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
1
7
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
2
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
6
8
5
*
*
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
=
0
-
0
.
0
3
5
9
0
.
1
4
4
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
5
6
-
0
.
0
9
9
5
-
0
.
1
6
2
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
-
0
.
2
8
2
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
2
4
1
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
0
.
2
8
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
4
4
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
4
9
4
*
0
.
1
5
8
4
0
.
5
4
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
7
2
2
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
2
0
0
.
1
3
6
6
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
4
1
2
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
5
9
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
4
0
-
0
.
0
4
9
2
-
0
.
1
6
9
3
*
-
0
.
2
4
7
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
2
-
0
.
0
2
9
6
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
=
0
-
0
.
0
1
8
4
-
0
.
0
6
0
9
0
.
3
1
8
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
9
0
-
0
.
1
8
1
8
*
*
-
0
.
3
4
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
1
6
-
0
.
3
7
9
3
*
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
0
.
8
6
4
4
*
*
*
1
.
3
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
9
5
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
8
0
8
2
*
*
*
1
.
1
5
4
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
6
9
9
*
*
*
1
.
0
8
7
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
9
9
9
*
*
*
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
=
0
1
.
0
2
3
9
*
*
*
1
.
2
7
5
1
*
*
*
0
.
6
1
8
5
*
*
*
0
.
5
4
1
4
*
*
*
0
.
7
6
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
8
8
4
3
*
*
*
0
.
9
0
1
8
*
*
*
1
.
1
3
3
8
*
*
*
E
M
A
N
C
I
P
A
T
I
O
N
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
7
5
9
-
0
.
2
2
3
6
*
*
*
0
.
2
9
0
2
-
0
.
5
2
5
1
*
-
0
.
1
2
5
4
-
0
.
4
4
0
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
7
4
0
.
0
8
0
2
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
=
0
-
0
.
0
2
3
7
0
.
1
4
9
7
*
-
0
.
4
3
4
6
0
.
1
8
5
9
0
.
1
0
3
6
0
.
0
7
0
5
0
.
0
8
2
2
0
.
1
4
2
1
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
0
.
1
8
3
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
7
2
-
0
.
0
1
5
8
-
0
.
1
3
3
7
0
.
2
6
3
9
*
*
*
0
.
4
3
2
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
7
9
-
0
.
0
8
9
2
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
=
0
0
.
2
1
5
3
*
*
*
0
.
4
4
5
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
3
4
2
0
.
2
3
1
9
0
.
2
0
9
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
9
7
0
.
1
1
5
2
0
.
2
1
5
9
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
3
.
8
9
4
2
*
*
*
4
.
0
0
0
5
*
*
*
3
.
8
3
8
4
*
*
*
3
.
1
6
3
8
*
*
*
3
.
8
3
0
9
*
*
*
3
.
2
2
8
5
*
*
*
3
.
2
5
7
9
*
*
*
4
.
1
6
4
3
*
*
*
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
=
0
0
.
5
7
4
2
*
0
.
7
3
8
0
*
1
4
.
8
0
4
1
.
9
5
7
8
*
0
.
9
8
0
1
*
*
0
.
7
2
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
3
1
5
4
*
0
.
5
1
9
9
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
w
n
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
E
C
H
P
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
:
*
*
*
9
9
%
c
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
,
*
*
9
5
%
a
n
d
*
9
0
%
.
37T
a
b
l
e
4
:
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
s
t
a
t
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
a
n
d
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
t
r
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
o
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
e
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
(
w
h
e
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
a
t
9
5
%
c
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
)
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
P
O
V
E
R
T
Y
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
0
.
1
5
8
0
.
2
0
4
0
.
3
1
9
0
.
2
6
6
0
.
2
1
4
0
.
2
5
7
0
.
2
8
5
0
.
2
1
1
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
-
-
0
.
4
0
9
0
.
4
8
6
0
.
2
5
3
0
.
2
1
6
0
.
3
3
0
0
.
1
3
3
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
5
1
-
0
.
1
5
6
-
0
.
2
4
9
-
0
.
1
0
3
-
0
.
1
6
1
-
0
.
1
1
4
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
-
0
.
1
1
6
-
0
.
1
1
6
-
0
.
1
3
2
-
0
.
1
8
9
-
0
.
1
0
9
-
0
.
1
7
6
-
0
.
1
3
1
-
0
.
1
7
6
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
5
7
-
0
.
0
4
4
-
-
0
.
0
8
6
-
-
0
.
0
9
7
-
0
.
0
8
5
-
0
.
0
4
6
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
3
9
-
0
.
0
7
5
-
0
.
0
4
4
-
-
0
.
0
4
4
-
0
.
0
4
2
-
0
.
0
3
7
-
0
.
0
4
7
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
0
.
0
6
2
0
.
0
3
9
-
-
0
.
1
1
1
0
.
1
5
3
-
-
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
8
8
-
0
.
0
4
1
-
-
-
-
0
.
0
4
3
-
-
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
0
.
2
1
4
0
.
2
8
2
0
.
2
4
8
0
.
2
1
5
0
.
2
8
9
0
.
2
5
9
0
.
2
3
0
0
.
2
1
3
E
M
A
N
C
I
P
A
T
E
D
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
t
−
1
-
-
0
.
0
0
9
-
-
-
-
0
.
0
1
5
-
-
E
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
t
−
1
0
.
7
6
0
0
.
7
3
2
0
.
2
4
3
0
.
2
8
9
0
.
4
7
5
0
.
5
5
8
0
.
6
2
7
0
.
7
9
2
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
t
−
1
0
.
0
0
6
-
-
-
0
.
0
5
6
0
.
0
1
5
-
-
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
w
n
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
E
C
H
P
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
.
38A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
A
.
1
:
C
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
t
r
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
p
r
o
b
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
o
n
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
e
m
a
n
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
s
(
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
)
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
K
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
P
O
V
E
R
T
Y
E
Q
U
A
T
I
O
N
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-
0
.
8
3
1
7
-
1
.
6
2
1
0
*
*
-
1
4
.
4
4
7
1
0
.
6
1
1
-
0
.
2
3
3
3
0
.
5
1
5
9
3
.
6
1
1
7
*
*
*
-
4
.
4
5
8
3
*
*
*
(
0
.
8
0
1
2
)
(
0
.
7
6
4
5
)
-
1
7
.
1
0
7
-
1
6
.
2
1
6
-
1
0
.
9
7
0
(
0
.
9
2
0
0
)
-
1
3
.
0
8
3
-
1
4
.
7
4
0
E
t
-
0
.
4
9
0
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
3
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
7
5
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
8
7
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
1
3
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
1
5
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
8
0
3
4
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
7
5
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
0
)
(
0
.
0
9
6
5
)
(
0
.
1
1
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
6
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
5
6
7
)
(
0
.
0
7
6
4
)
(
0
.
1
0
7
5
)
L
t
0
.
1
3
2
1
-
0
.
0
0
7
4
2
.
2
8
6
7
*
*
*
2
.
4
5
0
1
*
*
*
1
.
3
2
4
6
*
*
*
0
.
9
5
5
8
*
*
*
1
.
5
3
9
0
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
7
3
*
*
(
0
.
0
8
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
7
3
9
)
(
0
.
1
7
9
8
)
(
0
.
1
6
5
5
)
(
0
.
1
0
8
7
)
(
0
.
0
8
7
5
)
(
0
.
1
3
8
1
)
(
0
.
2
3
6
4
)
P
t
−
1
0
.
6
3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
9
7
*
*
*
1
.
1
2
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
8
9
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
3
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
8
6
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
9
9
4
*
*
*
0
.
8
6
6
9
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
1
4
)
(
0
.
0
3
5
8
)
(
0
.
0
9
3
9
)
(
0
.
1
2
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
7
7
)
(
0
.
0
5
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
7
3
7
)
(
0
.
1
0
1
0
)
E
t
−
1
-
0
.
1
5
7
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
7
4
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
0
8
5
-
0
.
3
1
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
8
3
-
0
.
3
9
7
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
7
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
4
8
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
5
9
)
(
0
.
0
4
6
6
)
(
0
.
0
8
9
9
)
(
0
.
1
0
1
3
)
(
0
.
0
6
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
7
1
)
(
0
.
0
6
8
5
)
(
0
.
0
9
7
1
)
L
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
2
1
4
0
.
2
0
6
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
7
1
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
9
5
9
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
5
7
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
6
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
0
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
5
(
0
.
0
9
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
9
)
(
0
.
1
3
9
9
)
(
0
.
1
4
3
8
)
(
0
.
1
0
6
7
)
(
0
.
0
8
4
0
)
(
0
.
1
2
1
8
)
(
0
.
2
3
0
2
)
P
0
1
.
1
1
8
1
*
*
*
1
.
0
9
6
5
*
*
*
0
.
3
5
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
8
2
2
7
*
*
*
1
.
1
1
0
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
1
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
8
7
8
2
*
*
*
1
.
1
8
4
5
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
6
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
7
0
)
(
0
.
1
5
1
4
)
(
0
.
0
9
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
7
6
7
)
(
0
.
1
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
1
5
0
7
)
E
0
0
.
0
3
3
5
0
.
1
4
0
9
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
4
2
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
4
0
-
0
.
2
0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
6
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
6
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
1
9
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
9
7
)
(
0
.
0
5
9
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
7
4
)
(
0
.
1
2
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
7
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
6
6
3
)
(
0
.
0
8
9
3
)
(
0
.
1
3
2
8
)
L
0
0
.
2
9
6
6
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
2
7
-
0
.
5
3
1
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
9
2
1
*
*
-
0
.
2
1
3
7
*
*
-
0
.
1
1
0
4
-
0
.
1
8
3
8
0
.
0
2
1
7
(
0
.
0
8
8
0
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
6
)
(
0
.
1
5
1
8
)
(
0
.
1
6
9
9
)
(
0
.
1
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
9
0
5
)
(
0
.
1
2
4
3
)
(
0
.
2
2
6
1
)
a
g
e
-
0
.
1
7
7
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
8
4
-
0
.
0
4
8
6
0
.
2
5
8
1
0
.
0
5
2
6
-
0
.
1
1
2
6
-
0
.
3
2
6
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
4
1
1
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
9
8
)
(
0
.
0
5
8
5
)
(
0
.
1
7
0
7
)
(
0
.
2
6
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
8
8
9
)
(
0
.
0
8
6
5
)
(
0
.
1
0
9
0
)
(
0
.
1
3
9
9
)
a
g
e
2
0
.
0
0
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
2
9
-
0
.
0
0
5
9
0
.
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
2
9
*
0
.
0
0
6
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
6
6
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
7
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
0
.
1
4
6
2
*
0
.
0
5
0
1
0
.
0
8
7
7
-
0
.
5
0
6
7
*
*
-
0
.
1
2
7
9
-
0
.
0
6
8
7
-
0
.
0
9
7
8
0
.
5
8
7
3
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
8
4
6
)
(
0
.
0
8
1
7
)
(
0
.
1
9
9
3
)
(
0
.
2
4
8
7
)
(
0
.
1
2
2
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
5
3
)
(
0
.
1
3
7
7
)
(
0
.
1
8
2
2
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
2
-
0
.
0
0
3
9
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
0
9
-
0
.
0
0
5
3
0
.
0
0
9
8
*
0
.
0
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
0
8
0
.
0
0
1
3
-
0
.
0
1
1
4
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
4
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
8
)
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
.
.
.
39T
a
b
l
e
A
.
1
–
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
f
r
o
m
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
K
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
s
e
x
-
0
.
0
7
3
1
*
-
0
.
0
2
8
4
-
0
.
1
6
0
1
*
*
-
0
.
0
7
4
6
-
0
.
1
0
4
9
*
-
0
.
0
8
0
5
*
-
0
.
0
6
0
5
-
0
.
2
4
3
5
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
3
8
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
6
7
)
(
0
.
0
7
6
9
)
(
0
.
0
5
5
7
)
(
0
.
0
4
7
4
)
(
0
.
0
6
6
9
)
(
0
.
0
8
7
8
)
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
E
Q
U
A
T
I
O
N
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-
9
.
0
2
6
6
*
*
*
-
5
.
1
8
4
7
*
*
*
-
2
.
2
0
5
2
*
-
7
.
5
8
6
2
*
*
*
0
.
9
4
8
4
-
1
0
.
0
6
5
1
*
*
*
-
1
.
7
9
9
7
*
-
5
.
2
9
1
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
8
1
5
6
)
(
0
.
7
9
8
2
)
-
1
2
.
9
3
0
-
1
2
.
7
6
7
(
0
.
8
2
3
9
)
(
0
.
8
4
9
9
)
-
1
0
.
7
9
0
-
1
2
.
8
6
1
L
t
0
.
2
8
4
1
*
*
*
0
.
2
4
4
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
4
9
4
*
0
.
1
5
8
4
0
.
5
4
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
7
2
2
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
4
2
0
0
.
1
3
6
6
(
0
.
0
7
9
2
)
(
0
.
0
8
0
6
)
(
0
.
1
4
3
6
)
(
0
.
1
3
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
9
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
8
0
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
5
9
)
(
0
.
1
9
8
0
)
P
t
−
1
-
0
.
1
7
8
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
2
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
0
9
4
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
8
5
-
0
.
2
2
2
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
1
7
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
2
3
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
6
8
5
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
6
3
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
4
)
(
0
.
1
0
2
6
)
(
0
.
1
1
1
3
)
(
0
.
0
5
8
7
)
(
0
.
0
5
8
4
)
(
0
.
0
7
4
9
)
(
0
.
1
2
0
0
)
E
t
−
1
0
.
8
6
4
4
*
*
*
1
.
3
0
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
9
5
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
8
0
8
2
*
*
*
1
.
1
5
4
0
*
*
*
1
.
0
6
9
9
*
*
*
1
.
0
8
7
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
9
9
9
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
8
6
)
(
0
.
0
6
6
4
)
(
0
.
0
8
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
3
9
9
)
(
0
.
0
4
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
7
)
(
0
.
0
7
1
0
)
L
t
−
1
-
0
.
4
1
2
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
2
5
9
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
4
0
-
0
.
0
4
9
2
-
0
.
1
6
9
3
*
-
0
.
2
4
7
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
4
2
-
0
.
0
2
9
6
(
0
.
0
8
0
1
)
(
0
.
0
8
5
7
)
(
0
.
1
3
1
6
)
(
0
.
1
2
8
1
)
(
0
.
0
9
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
7
2
2
)
(
0
.
1
1
6
5
)
(
0
.
1
8
3
7
)
P
0
-
0
.
0
3
5
9
0
.
1
4
4
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
4
5
6
-
0
.
0
9
9
5
-
0
.
1
6
2
6
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
8
0
-
0
.
2
8
2
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
2
4
1
(
0
.
0
5
2
5
)
(
0
.
0
5
0
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
3
6
)
(
0
.
1
1
3
0
)
(
0
.
0
6
3
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
9
7
)
(
0
.
0
8
3
1
)
(
0
.
1
3
2
9
)
E
0
1
.
0
2
3
9
*
*
*
1
.
2
7
5
1
*
*
*
0
.
6
1
8
5
*
*
*
0
.
5
4
1
4
*
*
*
0
.
7
6
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
8
8
4
3
*
*
*
0
.
9
0
1
8
*
*
*
1
.
1
3
3
8
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
5
1
)
(
0
.
0
6
8
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
7
3
)
(
0
.
0
9
7
4
)
(
0
.
0
5
5
6
)
(
0
.
0
6
1
2
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
9
)
(
0
.
1
1
2
4
)
L
0
-
0
.
0
1
8
4
-
0
.
0
6
0
9
0
.
3
1
8
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
9
0
-
0
.
1
8
1
8
*
*
-
0
.
3
4
4
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
1
6
-
0
.
3
7
9
3
*
(
0
.
0
8
4
2
)
(
0
.
0
8
7
5
)
(
0
.
1
0
8
5
)
(
0
.
1
3
6
1
)
(
0
.
0
8
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
7
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
0
1
4
)
(
0
.
1
9
9
2
)
a
g
e
0
.
5
8
7
8
*
*
*
0
.
4
9
6
0
*
*
*
0
.
2
5
9
5
*
*
0
.
8
1
4
4
*
*
*
0
.
1
9
3
3
*
*
*
0
.
8
0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.
2
0
7
1
*
*
0
.
5
5
8
4
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
9
9
)
(
0
.
0
6
4
4
)
(
0
.
1
2
8
4
)
(
0
.
1
8
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
6
5
2
)
(
0
.
0
7
5
7
)
(
0
.
0
8
3
8
)
(
0
.
1
0
6
7
)
a
g
e
2
-
0
.
0
0
9
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
3
-
0
.
0
1
2
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
3
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
4
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
5
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
0
5
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
5
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
0
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
0
.
0
0
3
8
-
0
.
2
1
4
8
*
*
-
0
.
1
5
8
3
-
0
.
3
3
2
7
*
-
0
.
3
2
7
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
2
2
-
0
.
0
9
9
3
-
0
.
1
9
1
8
(
0
.
0
8
3
8
)
(
0
.
0
8
6
6
)
(
0
.
1
3
8
3
)
(
0
.
1
7
1
0
)
(
0
.
0
8
8
7
)
(
0
.
0
9
1
3
)
(
0
.
1
1
4
1
)
(
0
.
1
3
9
3
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
2
-
0
.
0
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
3
9
*
*
0
.
0
0
1
6
0
.
0
0
5
5
0
.
0
0
6
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
2
8
0
.
0
0
3
4
0
.
0
0
3
9
(
0
.
0
0
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
4
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
8
)
s
e
x
-
0
.
5
3
5
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
5
4
9
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
2
8
2
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
7
2
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
7
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
3
4
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
5
3
6
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
3
3
6
6
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
9
1
)
(
0
.
0
4
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
6
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
6
1
0
)
(
0
.
0
4
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
4
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
6
0
6
)
(
0
.
0
7
3
0
)
E
M
A
N
C
I
P
A
T
I
O
N
E
Q
U
A
T
I
O
N
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-
1
2
.
6
0
3
8
*
*
*
-
1
1
.
0
5
1
9
*
*
*
-
3
2
.
8
8
2
5
*
*
*
-
2
5
.
5
7
5
1
*
*
*
-
1
4
.
0
5
9
8
*
*
*
-
1
1
.
9
7
2
8
*
*
*
-
7
.
6
4
0
7
*
*
*
-
8
.
8
2
6
5
*
*
*
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
.
.
.
40T
a
b
l
e
A
.
1
–
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
f
r
o
m
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
K
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
-
1
6
.
0
2
5
-
1
5
.
8
4
0
-
5
6
.
4
0
0
-
6
6
.
5
7
2
-
2
1
.
5
5
4
-
1
4
.
7
5
7
-
1
4
.
5
7
4
-
3
1
.
1
2
2
P
t
−
1
-
0
.
0
7
5
9
-
0
.
2
2
3
6
*
*
*
0
.
2
9
0
2
-
0
.
5
2
5
1
*
-
0
.
1
2
5
4
-
0
.
4
4
0
0
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
7
4
0
.
0
8
0
2
(
0
.
0
9
1
0
)
(
0
.
0
8
3
1
)
(
0
.
4
2
2
7
)
(
0
.
2
8
5
2
)
(
0
.
1
6
7
6
)
(
0
.
1
0
0
4
)
(
0
.
1
4
3
9
)
(
0
.
2
1
0
0
)
E
t
−
1
0
.
1
8
3
1
*
*
*
0
.
0
2
7
2
-
0
.
0
1
5
8
-
0
.
1
3
3
7
0
.
2
6
3
9
*
*
*
0
.
4
3
2
6
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
9
7
9
-
0
.
0
8
9
2
(
0
.
0
6
8
9
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
3
)
(
0
.
1
7
1
8
)
(
0
.
1
7
8
7
)
(
0
.
1
0
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
8
3
9
)
(
0
.
1
0
0
0
)
(
0
.
1
6
5
5
)
L
t
−
1
3
.
8
9
4
2
*
*
*
4
.
0
0
0
5
*
*
*
3
.
8
3
8
4
*
*
*
3
.
1
6
3
8
*
*
*
3
.
8
3
0
9
*
*
*
3
.
2
2
8
5
*
*
*
3
.
2
5
7
9
*
*
*
4
.
1
6
4
3
*
*
*
(
0
.
1
5
8
7
)
(
0
.
1
5
5
4
)
-
1
1
.
7
0
9
(
0
.
4
0
9
8
)
(
0
.
1
9
8
5
)
(
0
.
1
4
7
3
)
(
0
.
1
1
6
7
)
(
0
.
3
9
6
4
)
P
0
-
0
.
0
2
3
7
0
.
1
4
9
7
*
-
0
.
4
3
4
6
0
.
1
8
5
9
0
.
1
0
3
6
0
.
0
7
0
5
0
.
0
8
2
2
0
.
1
4
2
1
(
0
.
0
8
2
6
)
(
0
.
0
7
7
9
)
(
0
.
4
2
0
7
)
(
0
.
2
6
3
2
)
(
0
.
1
5
5
2
)
(
0
.
0
9
0
7
)
(
0
.
1
3
3
6
)
(
0
.
2
0
8
0
)
E
0
0
.
2
1
5
3
*
*
*
0
.
4
4
5
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
3
4
2
0
.
2
3
1
9
0
.
2
0
9
2
*
*
-
0
.
0
5
9
7
0
.
1
1
5
2
0
.
2
1
5
9
(
0
.
0
7
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
9
1
9
)
(
0
.
2
0
6
1
)
(
0
.
2
0
9
4
)
(
0
.
1
0
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
8
5
9
)
(
0
.
0
9
7
0
)
(
0
.
1
3
9
2
)
L
0
0
.
5
7
4
2
*
0
.
7
3
8
0
*
1
4
.
8
0
4
1
.
9
5
7
8
*
0
.
9
8
0
1
*
*
0
.
7
2
3
2
*
*
*
0
.
3
1
5
4
*
0
.
5
1
9
9
(
0
.
3
2
8
4
)
(
0
.
3
9
4
3
)
-
1
6
.
1
1
3
-
1
1
.
0
3
8
(
0
.
3
8
3
5
)
(
0
.
2
4
5
2
)
(
0
.
1
6
4
4
)
-
1
1
.
9
1
6
a
g
e
0
.
6
7
0
3
*
*
*
0
.
7
2
1
8
*
*
*
1
.
7
4
1
6
*
*
*
1
.
7
8
6
0
*
*
*
0
.
8
7
4
7
*
*
*
0
.
6
7
3
6
*
*
*
0
.
3
5
8
3
*
*
0
.
5
0
7
7
*
*
(
0
.
1
1
4
3
)
(
0
.
1
1
3
2
)
(
0
.
4
5
3
3
)
(
0
.
4
6
2
7
)
(
0
.
1
5
5
2
)
(
0
.
1
3
8
0
)
(
0
.
1
4
7
5
)
(
0
.
2
2
5
2
)
a
g
e
2
-
0
.
0
1
2
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
1
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
2
7
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
3
6
4
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
7
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
1
4
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
0
*
*
-
0
.
0
0
7
2
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
1
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
9
)
(
0
.
0
0
4
2
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
-
0
.
0
0
1
0
-
0
.
2
1
3
1
0
.
8
3
5
6
*
0
.
1
5
8
6
-
0
.
0
6
8
1
0
.
0
5
3
6
0
.
0
9
0
9
-
0
.
0
3
6
8
(
0
.
1
4
6
6
)
(
0
.
1
4
4
6
)
(
0
.
5
0
4
3
)
(
0
.
4
4
4
3
)
(
0
.
1
8
5
1
)
(
0
.
1
5
6
4
)
(
0
.
1
8
0
9
)
(
0
.
2
6
7
0
)
m
e
a
n
a
g
e
2
0
.
0
0
1
6
0
.
0
0
4
2
-
0
.
0
2
2
8
*
-
0
.
0
0
2
2
0
.
0
0
3
7
0
.
0
0
1
1
-
0
.
0
0
0
6
-
0
.
0
0
0
4
(
0
.
0
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
7
)
(
0
.
0
1
1
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
9
8
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
6
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
7
)
(
0
.
0
0
5
5
)
s
e
x
0
.
2
7
0
4
*
*
*
0
.
3
9
6
9
*
*
*
0
.
5
6
5
2
*
*
*
0
.
6
9
6
0
*
*
*
0
.
6
7
1
2
*
*
*
0
.
4
1
7
1
*
*
*
0
.
3
0
5
4
*
*
*
0
.
2
8
9
4
*
*
(
0
.
0
5
9
8
)
(
0
.
0
6
8
0
)
(
0
.
1
7
5
7
)
(
0
.
2
1
1
5
)
(
0
.
1
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
6
4
2
)
(
0
.
0
7
2
6
)
(
0
.
1
3
0
7
)
σ
c
i
0
.
7
5
7
9
*
*
*
0
.
7
4
3
3
*
*
*
0
.
4
0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.
5
1
2
6
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
5
3
*
*
*
0
.
6
7
5
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
1
3
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
0
6
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
7
2
)
(
0
.
0
3
2
4
)
(
0
.
0
9
5
0
)
(
0
.
1
0
6
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
4
)
(
0
.
0
4
5
7
)
(
0
.
0
6
9
3
)
(
0
.
0
8
9
5
)
σ
h
i
0
.
8
1
6
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
9
2
2
*
*
*
0
.
4
6
1
3
*
*
*
0
.
5
6
9
8
*
*
*
0
.
6
8
9
5
*
*
*
0
.
6
4
9
2
*
*
*
0
.
7
7
8
2
*
*
*
0
.
8
5
2
4
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
3
3
2
)
(
0
.
0
3
7
8
)
(
0
.
0
6
3
9
)
(
0
.
0
7
4
8
)
(
0
.
0
3
7
8
)
(
0
.
0
4
0
0
)
(
0
.
0
5
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
7
1
5
)
σ
g
i
0
.
6
3
0
8
*
*
*
0
.
8
2
4
0
*
*
*
0
.
9
1
5
8
*
*
*
1
.
0
3
7
9
*
*
0
.
9
5
6
5
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
0
6
*
*
*
0
.
5
7
5
1
*
*
*
0
.
5
4
0
8
(
0
.
1
4
4
4
)
(
0
.
1
5
7
7
)
(
0
.
2
4
5
5
)
(
0
.
4
1
7
9
)
(
0
.
1
5
0
7
)
(
0
.
1
1
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
9
4
0
)
(
0
.
5
5
2
1
)
ρ
1
2
-
0
.
0
0
5
6
0
.
0
4
6
3
-
0
.
6
6
5
1
*
*
-
0
.
3
6
2
2
*
-
0
.
3
6
0
1
*
*
*
-
0
.
0
2
8
0
-
0
.
5
2
6
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
1
9
6
1
(
0
.
0
5
4
9
)
(
0
.
0
5
4
7
)
(
0
.
2
6
6
6
)
(
0
.
2
1
0
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
4
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
5
)
(
0
.
0
8
7
2
)
(
0
.
1
3
0
7
)
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
o
n
n
e
x
t
p
a
g
e
.
.
.
41T
a
b
l
e
A
.
1
–
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
f
r
o
m
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
a
i
n
I
t
a
l
y
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
F
r
a
n
c
e
U
K
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
ρ
1
3
0
.
2
1
7
6
*
*
0
.
0
6
6
9
-
0
.
6
9
8
7
*
0
.
0
7
8
5
0
.
0
2
8
1
0
.
4
7
2
5
*
*
*
0
.
1
1
0
1
0
.
3
9
4
8
(
0
.
0
9
8
3
)
(
0
.
0
7
5
0
)
(
0
.
3
7
8
5
)
(
0
.
2
3
1
9
)
(
0
.
1
1
0
1
)
(
0
.
1
4
0
3
)
(
0
.
1
8
1
1
)
(
0
.
4
0
0
9
)
ρ
2
3
0
.
3
3
9
9
*
*
*
0
.
3
7
5
4
*
*
*
0
.
4
5
8
6
*
0
.
0
8
8
5
-
0
.
2
0
9
4
*
*
-
0
.
2
6
5
2
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
9
2
0
.
1
1
0
5
(
0
.
0
9
0
7
)
(
0
.
0
7
8
9
)
(
0
.
2
3
8
1
)
(
0
.
1
9
2
3
)
(
0
.
1
0
0
1
)
(
0
.
1
3
0
7
)
(
0
.
1
2
6
0
)
(
0
.
2
4
9
8
)
l
n
-
L
-
1
7
5
6
8
.
4
8
-
1
8
4
1
9
.
5
4
-
3
7
7
8
.
1
4
-
4
6
7
9
.
3
2
-
1
1
6
7
7
.
9
0
-
1
2
1
1
8
.
3
4
-
7
4
3
2
.
3
8
-
4
6
8
2
.
6
5
N
1
9
8
2
7
2
3
1
3
7
5
0
4
2
5
2
6
8
1
5
7
1
5
1
4
8
8
4
1
0
4
2
0
6
3
9
7
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
O
w
n
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
E
C
H
P
,
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
1
.
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
:
*
*
*
9
9
%
c
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
,
*
*
9
5
%
a
n
d
*
9
0
%
.
A
l
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
42